___In General
The legislature has set forth certain conditions upon which maintenance will be terminated or modified, however, parties to a dissolution action are permitted to enter into settlement agreements which alter the court’s ability to terminate or modify maintenance and they take precedence over the statutory conditions. In re Brent
In determining whether there is sufficient cause to modify, the court may consider both the circumstances of the parents and the circumstances of the child. In re Stone
For a case discussing modification of alimony award, see Osborn v. Osborn
Denial of the husband’s motion to reduce the child support order was reversed because the trial court committed impermissible “double counting” of the husband’s workers’ compensation settlement proceeds when it awarded half of the settlement to wife and children but did not adjust the husband’s child support obligation. In re Marriage of Schacht
Modification
Where an order awarded a former wife rehabilitative maintenance and provided for review of the award some months later with no further pleadings to be filed by the parties, the review did not constitute a modification of the maintenance award; hence, § 510 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act 750 ILCS 5/510, did not apply. In re marriage of Culp
Trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding a substantial change in circumstances by a substantial reduction in wife’s income and ordering a $250 pay month increase in maintenance even though, in the original judgment, the court did provide for the diminution of payments when the husband’s salary as a reserve officer terminated; the court made no effort to prophesy or even speculate about the consequence of such reduction and certainly made no finding that the cessation of such payment would be reasonable for both parties. Thurston v. Thurston
A trial court did not abuse its discretion in increasing maintenance and child support where evidence showed that the fact that the parties’ daughter had asthma could have necessitated the wife’s decision to become self-employed, the wife had health problems, and the husband filed a written judicial admission of his ability to pay. Giamanco v. Giamanco
Where the trial court has not expressly reserved jurisdiction to extend the term of rehabilitative maintenance, the court retains authority to extend the maintenance beyond the original term in term in view of subsection (a) of this section when the petition for modification is filed during the period set for rehabilitative maintenance. Rice v. Rice
The trial court lacks jurisdiction to extend the duration of the maintenance award once the original time period for maintenance has expired. Rice v. Rice
A trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider a respondent’s petition seeking modification of a fixed, limited award of rehabilitative maintenance which was filed after the maintenance obligation had been satisfied, and where the court did not reserve jurisdiction to review such an award. Rice v. Rice
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant defendant’s petition to modify as to the marital residence when in the interim between the entry of the judgment and the filing of defendant’s petition to modify, the trial court terminated the maintenance provision, leaving nothing further to modify with respect to maintenance. In re Clark
Where the court had jurisdiction to modify the distribution of the proceeds, it was not necessary to reverse and remand the portion of the order which did so. In re Demond
Trial court has inherent jurisdiction to consider future child support in a dissolution proceeding and need not expressly retain jurisdiction. In re Petramale
Where there were no facts of record that demonstrated whose circumstances had changed, or in what manner, or who accepted what benefits from whom, there could be no estoppel to prevent wife from asserting that the court did not have jurisdiction to modify a divorce decree. Hartmen v. Hartman
A trial court’s order purportedly clarifying the supplemental judgment disposing of the property of the parties pursuant to the dissolution of their marriage, which actually modified the property rights of the husband, and which was entered more than 17 months after the supplemental judgment, was not effective, as the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter such a modification. In re Kekstadt
Where the petition for modification did not request that any increase be retroactive, and petitioner first requested this relief in a later petition for rehearing which was abandoned, this issue was not properly before the court. Scott v. Scott
Where an original divorce decree was entirely silent with regard to apportionment of any income tax refund, wife could not by her petition, requesting the award of income taxes withheld from her salary which had been included in a joint income tax return, involve the court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate property rights upon which the final word had already been spoken in the decree. Brickey v. Brickey
The property rights created in a divorce decree become vested and after 30 days the court is without jurisdiction to modify them. Brickey v. Brickey
Evidence presented was wholly inadequate to prove a substantial change in circumstances necessary for the termination of monthly maintenance payment. In re Logston
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding there had been no change in circumstances which would permit the modification sought by plaintiff where father did not show a change in financial resources of child, mother or father or in physical, emotional and educational needs of child. In re Emerson
The trial court could properly have determined that the small increase in custodial parent’s salary did not constitute a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification of the child support order. In re Butler
Where an ex-husband’s financial position appeared to have improved since the divorce, it appeared that the wife had never earned more than $3,500 in any given year, and that her monthly expenses exceeded her maintenance, and her testimony concerning her health and as to her ability to maintain limited employment was uncontroverted, there was nothing in the record of a substantial change in circumstances which would have warranted a reduction in maintenance and the trial court erred in so ordering. Goldberg v. Goldberg
The record did not demonstrate that the former husband sustained his burden of showing that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred which would have justified a downward modification of support payment. Roqueplot v. Roqueplot
Defendant did not establish a substantial change of his circumstances to justify suspension or termination of payments. In re Potter
Under section 19 of the former Divorce Act, (see now this section), where a court’s order of March 22, 1977, clearly stated that plaintiff had failed to show a material change in circumstances since entry of the order entered on or about November 26, 1975, the court’s material change in the circumstances of the parties, and assuming arguendo that the court found a material change in plaintiff’s circumstances only, a modification of the decree still could not stand since a careful examination of the record revealed no evidence that defendant was able to pay additional alimony. Dunn v. Dunn
Husband’s increased expenses, largely the result of only secondary of a house pursuant to his remarriage, where of only secondary consideration vis-à-vis the obligation owed to his former wife on the question of support and were not a change in circumstances warranting a reduction in maintenance. Berkeimer v. Berkeimer
Where the trial court considered the provisions at issue and the various arguments of counsel and concluded that the decree contemplated a monthly child support payment of $550, without contingencies or abatements and, therefore, the sale of the former marital residence was not a material change in circumstances so as to warrant a reduction in child support payments, this construction was reasonable and not clearly erroneous so as to require the reviewing court to disturb the trial court’s ruling. Winter v. Winter
A judgment terminating the respondent’s child support obligation, setting aside a lien of trust from respondent’s interest in a trust and removing the obligations of injunction prohibiting him from conveying, transferring or assigning his interest in that property was reversed where no change in circumstances existed and where the original reason for ordering the respondent’s chief asset, his fractional interest in the trust, to be placed in trust as security for the future payment, of the court ordered child support was because of the respondent’s demonstrated untrustworthiness and to insure continued payment of child support from the respondent’s assets in the event of the respondent’s refusal to do so. Gentile v. Gentile
While there was a statement in the record by wife’s counsel that husband was making the payments on the second mortgage, there was no indication that he ceased making those payments and thus, there simply was no evidence in the record to support the wife’s allegation that circumstances had changed since the entry of the decree and thus modification of child support was not warranted. Waggoner v. Waggoner
There was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that intervening circumstances had substantially changed to justify a modification of support payment under this section. Westerberg v. Stephens
Even had defendant lost overtime earnings, this would not have been a permanent change in circumstances and thus could not have been a valid basis for permanent reduction of child support payments. Dixon v. Dixon
The evidence did not reveal a change of circumstances warranting an increase in child support. Nordstrom v. Nordstrom
As to the children’s increased needs, plaintiff’s testimony consisted almost entirely of general statements and was often concerned with the rise in prices due to inflation; increased expenditures due to inflation apply to defendant as well as to plaintiff; consequently, this factor, in and of itself, is not sufficient to establish a material change in circumstances. Nordstrom v. Nordstrom
Father’s change in employment status, which yielded a 130 percent increase in the father’s weekly income, was sufficient to support a petition for modification of the father’s support obligation under 750 ILCS 5/510(a) and required application of the support guidelines found in 750 ILCS 5/505. Anderson v. Heckman
Where a trial court’s decision reducing child support is based on a finding of an obligor’s good-faith voluntary change of employments, on appeal the party opposing the motion may attach either the finding the obligor acted in good faith in changing employment or that such a change justified a reduction in child support. In re Barnard
Whether respondent’s conduct leading to the loss of his employment constituted acts of commission or omission, the evidence was sufficient to allow the trial court to conclude that his conduct was deliberate and his discharge was not merely a fortuitous occurrence; under these circumstances, the trial court could properly view his change of employment as “voluntary” and the record supported the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in denying respondent’s petition to modify his support obligation. In re Imlay
If the trial court, upon allowing a petition for modification under this section, finds that a spouse receiving maintenance is appropriately employed, it may reduce maintenance commensurate with her ability to gain financial independence; on the other hand, if the spouse receiving maintenance is able to work but unwilling to obtain appropriate employment and is not making a good faith effort to gain financial independence, it may reduce or discontinue maintenance. Conversely, if the court finds that there is a good reason for her inability to achieve full or partial financial independence, it may continue such maintenance and extend its duration. In re Gunn
If the employment change is voluntary, the change in employment must be made in good faith and not prompted by a desire to avoid one’s child support obligation for modification to be allowed. In re Lavelle
Child support payments should be reduced where substantial economic reversals result from an involuntary change or loss of employment. In re Lavelle
A good faith, voluntary change in employment which results in reduced financial ability can constitute a substantial change in circumstances justifying a reduction in a child support obligation by the court; the test for determining if a decision was made in good faith is whether the change was prompted by a desire to evade financial responsibility for supporting the children or the otherwise jeopardize their interests. In re Webber
Where the record supported a determination that respondent’s decision to return to college and reduce the hours of his employment was made in good faith and not out of a desire to evade his financial responsibilities, the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a reduction in his child support payments. In re Webber
Good faith in a spouse’s voluntary change of employment is not shown where it can be determined that the change has been prompted by a desire to evade financial responsibility to the supported spouse. In re Kowski
A voluntary, good faith change in employment need not equal or increase the spouse’s income; indeed, substantial reductions may be permissible and do not per se constitute lack of good faith. In re Kowski
Unless good faith is shown, a voluntary termination of employment by a supporting spouse is not considered a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant abatement or modification of support obligations. In re Ebert
It was within the discretion of the trial court to abate the child support payments on the uncontradicted testimony of the father that he was discharged from his employment and had no other income. Glass v. Peitchel
In an uncontested, agreed-upon divorce, the parties can agree on whether the child-support payments should be paid directly by the payor, or paid through a state disbursement unit who keeps track of the payments and allocates those funds to the recipient. If there is an agreed-upon case, I would allow the payor to make payments directly to the recipient, if that’s what the parties desired. In a case where there is vitriol, and the party simply cannot agree on anything, I would recommend or require that the child support payments be paid through a State disbursement unit. The advantages of a State disbursement unit are this: the recipient does not have to contact the person paying the support. The money will flow directly out of the payor’s paycheck; it will be submitted to the State disbursement unit; and the state disbursement unit will then pay those funds for child support to the recipient. It basically takes the friction, if there is any between the parties at this point, out of the picture. I highly recommend that child support payments be paid through a State disbursement unit and not directly between the parties.
Yes. The obligation to pay child support is unrelated to where the child or the ex-spouse resides.Child support is just that, support for the child.It makes no difference if the child is living one block away or all the way across the country, if they have permission to do so by the court.It also doesn’t matter, the fact that you may not see the child as often, since they had moved out of the state or even out of the country.However, the obligation to pay child support still exists, absent a court order to the contrary.
